Central America and Africa, are preparing for WAR. Who do you
think their supposed enemy might be?
Just in case it's us, I think we should prepare for the worst, don't
you?
victorious in every battle."
- Sun Tzu
On Guerrilla Warfare
In a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla operations are a necessary part. This is particularly true in war waged for the emancipation
of a people who inhabit a vast nation. China is such a nation, a nation whose techniques are undeveloped and whose communications are
poor. She finds herself confronted with a strong and victorious Japanese imperialism. Under these circumstances, the development of the
type of guerrilla warfare characterized by the quality of mass is both necessary and natural. This warfare must be developed to an
unprecedented degree and it must co-ordinate with the operations of our regular armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it difficult to
defeat the enemy.
These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are but one step in the total war, one aspect
of the revolutionary struggle. They are the inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits
of their endurance. In our case, these hostilities began at a time when the people were unable to endure any more from the Japanese
imperialists. Lenin, in People and Revolution, said: "A people's insurrection and a people's revolution are not only natural but inevitable."
We consider guerrilla operations as but one aspect of our total or mass war because they, lacking the quality of independence, are of
themselves incapable of providing a solution to the struggle.
Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may
employ against a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into the heart of the weaker country and occupies her
territory in a cruel and oppressive manner, there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate, and society in general offer obstacles to
his progress and may be used to advantage by those who oppose him. In guerrilla warfare we turn these advantages to the purpose of
resisting and defeating the enemy.
During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the
regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached that
level of development combine to form the military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be no doubt that the ultimate result
of this will be victory.
Both in its development and in its method of application, guerrilla warfare has certain distinctive characteristics. We first will discuss the
relationship of guerrilla warfare to national policy. Because ours is the resistance of a semi colonial country against an imperialism, our
hostilities must have a clearly defined political goal and firmly established political responsibilities. Our basic policy is the creation of a
national united anti-Japanese front. This policy we pursue in order to gain our political goal, which is the complete emancipation of the
Chinese people. There are certain fundamental steps necessary in the realization of this policy, to wit:
1. Arousing and organizing the people.
2. Achieving internal unification politically.
3. Establishing bases.
4. Equipping forces.
5. Recovering national strength.
6. Destroying enemy's national strength.
7. Regaining lost territories.
There is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately from national policy. On the contrary, it must be organized and conducted in
complete accord with national anti-Japanese policy. It is only who misinterpret guerrilla action who say, as does Jen Ch'i Shan, "The
question of guerrilla hostilities is purely a military matter and not a political one." Those who maintain this simple point of view have lost
sight of the political goal and the political effects of guerrilla action. Such a simple point of view will cause the people to lose confidence
and will result in our defeat.
What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must, if its political
objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, co-operation, and assistance cannot be gained. The
essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character. On the other hand, in a war of counter-revolutionary nature, there is no
place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor
flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and co-operation. There are those who do not comprehend guerrilla action, and who
therefore do not understand the distinguishing qualities of a people's guerrilla war, who say: 'Only regular troops can carry on guerrilla
operations.' There are others who, because they do not believe in the ultimate success of guerilla action, mistakenly say: 'Guerrilla warfare
is an insignificant and highly specialized type of operation in which there is no place for the masses of the people' (Jen Ch'i Shan). Then
there are those who ridicule the masses and undermine resistance by wildly asserting that the people have no understanding of the war of
resistance (Yeh Ch'ing, for one). The moment that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise
moment that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese.
What is the organization for guerrilla warfare? Though all guerrilla bands that spring from the masses of the people suffer from lack of
organization at the time of their formation, they all have in common a basic quality that makes organization possible. All guerrilla units
must have political and military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units. Such units may originate locally, in
the masses of the people; they may be formed from an admixture of regular troops with groups of the people, or they may consist of
regular army units intact. And mere quantity does not affect this matter. Such units may consist of a squad of a few men, a battalion of
several hundred men, or a regiment of several thousand men.
All these must have leaders who are unyielding in their policies—resolute, loyal, sincere, and robust. These men must be well-educated
in revolutionary technique, self confident, able to establish severe discipline, and able to cope with counter-propaganda. In short, these
leaders must be models for the people. As the war progresses, such leaders lack of discipline which at first will gradually overcome the
lack of discipline which at first prevails; they will establish discipline in their forces, strengthening them and increasing their combat
efficiency. Thus eventual victory will be attained.
Unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory and those who attack the movement as a combination of banditry and
anarchism do not understand the nature of guerrilla action. They say, 'This movement is a haven for disappointed militarists, vagabonds,
and bandits' (Jen Ch'i Shan), hoping thus to bring the movement into disrepute. We do not deny that there are corrupt guerrillas, nor that
there are people who under the guise of guerrillas indulge in unlawful activities. Neither do we deny that the movement has at the present
time symptoms of a lack of organization, symptoms that might indeed be serious were we to judge guerrilla warfare solely by the corrupt
and temporary phenomena we have mentioned. We should study the corrupt phenomena and attempt to eradicate them in order to
encourage guerilla warfare, and to increase its military efficiency. 'This is hard work, there is no help for it, and the problem cannot be
solved immediately. The whole people must try to reform themselves during the course of the war. We must educate them and reform
them in the light of past experience. Evil does not exist in guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized and undisciplined activities that
are anarchism,' said Lenin, in On Guerrilla Warfare.[B]
What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the
enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather and the situation of the people.
In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow;
attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he
advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerilla strategy, the enemy's rear,
flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated. Only
in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of independent guerrilla action and coordination with the effort of the regular armies.
But, in spite of the most complete preparation, there can be no victory if mistakes are made in the matter of command. Guerilla warfare
based on the principles we have mentioned and carried out over a vast extent of territory in which communications are inconvenient will
contribute tremendously towards ultimate defeat of the Japanese and consequent emancipation of the Chinese people.
A careful distinction must be made between two types of guerrilla warfare. The fact that revolutionary guerrilla warfare is based on the
masses of the people does not in itself mean that the organization of guerrilla units is impossible in a war of counter-revolutionary
character. As examples of the former type we may cite Red guerilla hostilities during the Russian Revolution; those of the Reds China; of
the Abyssinians against the Italians for the past three years; those of the last seven years in Manchuria, and the vast anti-Japanese guerrilla
war that is carried on in China today. All these struggles have been carried on in the interest of the whole people or the greater part of
them; all had a broad basis in the national manpower and all have been in accord with the laws of historical development. They have
existed and will continue to exist, flourish, and develop as long as they are not contrary to national policy.
The second type of guerrilla warfare directly contradicts the law of historical development. Of this type, we may cite the examples
furnished by the White Russian guerrilla units organized by Denikin and Kolchak; those organized by the Japanese; those organized by the
Italians in Abyssinia; those supported by the puppet governments in Manchuria and Mongolia, and those that will be organized here by
Chinese traitors. All such have oppressed the masses and have been contrary to the true interests of the people. They must be firmly
opposed. They are easy to destroy because they lack a broad foundation in the people.
If we fail to differentiate between the two types of guerrilla hostilities mentioned, it is likely that we will exaggerate their effect when
applied by an invader. We might arrive at the conclusion that 'the invader can organize guerrilla units from among the people'. Such a
conclusion might well diminish our confidence in guerrilla warfare. As far as this matter is concerned, we have but to remember the
historical experience of revolutionary struggles.
Further, we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from those of a purely 'class' type. In the former case, the whole people of a
nation, without regard to class or party, carry on a guerrilla struggle that is an instrument of the national policy. Its basis is, therefore,
much broader than is the basis of a struggle of class type. Of a general guerrilla war, it has been said: 'When a nation is invaded, the
people become sympathetic to one another and all aid in organizing guerrilla units. In civil war, no matter to what extent guerrillas are
developed, they do not produce the same results as when they are formed to resist an invasion by foreigners' (Civil War in Russia). The
one strong feature of guerrilla warfare in a civil struggle is its quality of internal purity. One class may be easily united and perhaps fight
with great effect, whereas in a national revolutionary war, guerrilla units are faced with the problem of internal unification of different
class groups. This necessitates the use of propaganda. Both types of guerrilla war are, however, similar in that they both employ the same
military methods.
National guerrilla warfare, though historically of the same consistency, has employed varying implements as times, peoples, and
conditions differ. The guerrilla aspects of the Opium War, those of the fighting in Manchuria since the Mukden incident, and those
employed in China today are all slightly different. The guerrilla warfare conducted by the Moroccans against the French and the Spanish
was not exactly similar to that which we conduct today in China. These differences express the characteristics of different peoples in
different periods. Although there is a general similarity in the quality of all these struggles, there are dissimilarities in form. This fact we
must recognize. Clausewitz wrote, in On War: 'Wars in every period have independent forms and independent conditions, and, therefore,
every period must have its independent theory of war.' Lenin, in On Guerrilla Warfare said: 'As regards the form of fighting, it is
unconditionally requisite that history be investigated in order to discover the conditions of environment, the state of economic progress
and the political ideas that obtained, the national characteristics, customs, and degree of civilization.' Again: 'It is necessary to be
completely unsympathetic to abstract formulas and rules and to study with sympathy the conditions of the actual fighting, for these will
change in accordance with the political and economic situations and the realization of the people's aspirations. These progressive changes
in conditions create new methods.'
If, in today's struggle, we fail to apply the historical truths of revolutionary guerrilla war, we will fall into the error of believing with T'ou
Hsi Sheng that under the impact of Japan's mechanized army, 'the guerrilla unit has lost its historical function'. Jen Ch'i Shan writes: 'In
olden days guerrilla warfare was part of regular strategy but there is almost no chance that it can be applied today.' These opinions are
harmful. If we do not make an estimate of the characteristics peculiar to our anti-Japanese guerrilla war, but insist on applying to it
mechanical formulas derived from past history, we are making the mistake of placing our hostilities in the same category as all other
national guerrilla struggles. If we hold this view, we will simply be beating our heads against a stone wall and we will be unable to profit
from guerrilla hostilities.
To summarize: What is the guerrilla war of resistance against Japan? It is one aspect of the entire war, which, although alone incapable
of producing the decision, attacks the enemy in every quarter, diminishes the extent of area under his control, increases our national
strength, and assists our regular armies. It is one of the strategic instruments used to inflict defeat on our enemy. It is the one pure
expression of anti-Japanese policy, that is to say, it is military strength organized by the active people and inseparable from them. It is a
powerful special weapon with which we resist the Japanese and without which we cannot defeat them.
